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1. Essential Points of the Paper 
 
My aim in this paper is to analyze Chapter 8 of Andrei Marmor’s Interpreta-
tion and Legal Theory (quotations are from this book). The issue I’m going to 
deal with is the role of the legislature’s intentions in legal interpretation1. 
In my opinion, the role of the legislature’s intentions is linked up with Mar-
mor’s general idea of legal interpretation and the distinction between hard and 
easy cases. I think that above all it is concerned with the notion of authority and 
the idea of authority’s intention. This last point is stressed in other papers pub-
lished in this volume2. 
In the following pages, I’m going to give a brief statement of the main points 
of Chapter 8 and I’ll try to make a query about each point. I think that, all things 
considered, the ideas of Marmor on legal interpretation give to the interpreter a 
very big amount of freedom to determine the legislature’s intentions. So the rele-
vance of the legislature’s intentions to find a solution to a dispute risks to become 
the relevance of the judge’s intentions. 
At the beginning of the chapter (p. 119), Prof. Marmor identifies the follow-
ing points. First, he wonders if the legislature’s intention plays a certain role, or 
whatever one, in statutory interpretation. Marmor discusses this topic without 
considering constitutional interpretation, faced up in the next and final chapter3. 
This first and general question is divided by Prof. Marmor into two specific 
points that are a sort of cornerstone in the diatribe between ‘intentionalists’ and 
‘skeptics about intentions’. Marmor asserts that a) laws are promulgated, in cer-
tain cases, with ‘relatively specific intentions’ (p. 120) and that b) in some cir-
cumstances – once point a) has been ascertained – a law promulgated with ‘rela-
tively specific intentions’ provides the judge a reason to decide the dispute in ac-
cordance with the legislature’s relevant intention. 
 
 
1
 A. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (first edition 1992), revised second edition, 
Hart Publishing, 2005, pp. 119-139. For some comments on this chapter see J. Goldswor-
thy, Marmor on Meaning, interpretation and Legislative Intent, in Legal Theory, 1995, pp. 
439-464; J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999, pp. 119-146. 
2 See especially A. Schiavello, Law, Interpretation and Authority, in this volume. 
3 See on this topic G. Itzcovich, Law, Social Change and Legal Positivism. Some Remarks 
to Marmor on Constitutional Legitimacy and Interpretation, in this volume. 
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2. Whose Intentions and What Kind of Intentions? 
 
In the chapter, the author moves through recurring cruxes in the Anglo-Saxon 
debate about the relevance of the legislature’s intention in statutory interpretation, 
rejecting some of the options on the table, for example by means of an employ-
ment of counterfactuals. In so doing, Marmor arrives to the main two issues we 
face: whose intention is predicated (that is: who is the legislature that is consid-
ered); which intentions are at stake (the types of intentions). 
About the first point, Prof. Marmor says – if I am not wrong – that what mat-
ters is simply the fact that there is a legislature, that is, a subject that promulgates 
legal norms according to certain procedures. As claimed by Marmor, legislative 
power is a complex entity and the same we can say about his activities (namely, 
the fact that ‘legislation in legislative assemblies is a complex and concerted ac-
tion involving elaborate procedures’, p. 126). Mainly, Marmor rejects the idea 
that we may not ascribe any intentions to the legislature and he states that it is 
possible to do so (‘The conceptual doubts about the possibility of ascribing inten-
tions to the legislature do not seem to be well founded’, p. 126). On this topic I 
wonder whether the legislature we are concerned with is the real or the ideal one. 
I mean that it’s not clear if the intentions we are concerned with are data that we 
find analyzing the legislature in its real mood or if they are the characteristics the 
legislature has by definition. I add that the presence of them, frequent or rare as it 
might be, could justify not only a theoretical study of Marmor’s book, but also an 
empirical analysis about the functions of the legislation. According to Marmor, 
denying this last aspect would involve denying the idea of ‘legislature that legis-
lates’ itself.4  
About the second issue, the author identifies three types of legislature’s inten-
tions legally relevant: 1) those intentions that have been made manifest by the 
formulation of the rule itself (‘the intentions that are manifest in the language of 
the law itself’); 2) the so-called ‘further intentions’; 3) intentions concerning the 
application of the law, that is to say, intentions ‘about its proper application’ (a 
sum up is at p. 132). In my opinion, this classification is of paramount impor-
tance. 
As to the identification of the intentions involved in the law, manifest by the 
formulation of the rule itself, the author says that it is a matter of logic; as he 
writes, this is ‘a rather trivial point’. Actually the question sounds too easy. I 
wonder whether here ‘logical’ means ‘tautological’ or rather obvious and reason-
able. I would thus understand more easily the characterization of such question as 
logical and ‘trivial’. On the other hand, if the intentions of the legislature were 
identifiable as obvious and reasonable, they would constitute the basis of a defea-
sible interpretation. I think that this is a plausible assumption (as Marmor shows 
 
 
4 A. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, p. 125. 
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with the example in the book)5. But I try to present a third hypothesis. In the 
model of Marmor, the intentions that are manifest in the law are a sort of data 
which we can regard as the ground of comprehension: so, Marmor states a topic 
that sounds perfectly consistent with the rest of his work. The problem is 
grounded in his general theory of legal interpretation, but this is a subject I cannot 
deal with here6. 
About further intentions, as Marmor calls them, the issue is more articulated (see 
pp. 127-129). He maintains that the legislature, promulgating norms, is usually en-
dowed with other intentions in addition to those ones that rules manifest through 
their formulations; moreover, it is difficult to keep distinct the further intentions from 
the motivations that might have driven the legislature. In fact, both intentions are of-
ten not declared; enquiring on motives means identifying further intentions (‘there is 
often a substantial overlap between motives and further intentions’, p. 128).  
In my opinion, the distinction between further intentions that are legally rele-
vant and further intentions that are legally irrelevant is an issue that should be 
stressed. According to Prof. Marmor it is difficult to find a criterion to distinguish 
between them and to keep up with this couple in the legal cases, but the distinc-
tion we are concerned with is useful. The author maintains that ‘certain types of 
speech-act, such as insinuating, deceiving, showing off, etc. have the rather 
unique feature that the speaker’s further intention is essentially non-avowable’, 
because ‘rendering it explicit would be self defeating’. Marmor says that this 
situation might happen with regard to the legislature too. His idea is that further 
intentions really are legally relevant if it’s not a trouble that they become explicit 
(‘On the contrary, there is a strong element of self defeat in rendering such inten-
tions explicit’; this and the previous quotation come from p. 129). 
On this point it is possible to develop some considerations. I wonder whether 
the analogy between a speaker’s non explicitable intentions, performing certain 
speech-acts, and the legislature is well conceived or not. The two situations look 
similar if the legislature is characterized as a real man. But, a subjective and indi-
vidual characterization as such gets becoming unreal. All things considered, shar-
ing the analogy is not the last step of the argument: in fact, the criterion that Prof. 
Marmor’s states, as he writes, ‘is only a partial criterion, which will often require 
supplementation by other, primarily moral, considerations’ (p. 129). I think that 
this supplement of moral considerations throws a rather wide shadow on the dis-
tinction, since it becomes too much difficult to identify the legally relevant fur-
ther intentions. In other words: if this distinction is important, or, better, essential, 
the criterion on which it is grounded cannot be indeterminate, or in any case par-
tial and in need to be integrated with moral criteria. On this way, would further 
intentions be legally relevant even so? 
 
 
5 On the topic see G.B. Ratti, The Consequences of Defeasibility, in this volume. 
6 I agree with the most part of the argument developed by F. Poggi, Semantics, Pragmatics 
and Interpretation, in this volume. 
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In my opinion, Marmor has in mind the real legislature but in his book he re-
fers to the real legislature that someone wishes, or, we can say, the ideal legisla-
ture7. Instead of referring to the real legislator, Marmor’s legal theory has an im-
plicit reference to a model; he assumes a legislature’s model on which he builds 
up the types of intentions I am analyzing. This is not necessarily a problem, but 
maybe it is for this chapter, at least when intentions are investigated with refer-
ence to a real legislature and not in counterfactual terms8. 
That the legislature might harbor some expectations about the application of 
the promulgated law seems a reasonable idea, I would say, close to common 
sense. The question is, as usual, how one could detect such expectations and 
translate them into means for the interpretation of law. The most difficult aspect 
is how to distinguish them from further intentions, because it seems that applica-
tion intentions are, in some sense, always further intentions; but even granted 
such aspect, it is important to analyze the assumption for which ‘application in-
tentions are potentially relevant only when, as a matter of fact, the legislature has 
had a determinate intention bearing on the issue before the court’ (pp. 129-130). 
This is an assumption whose explanatory force is not so clear and should be mo-
tivated in a more strong way. 
With reference to the three types of intentions, Prof. Marmor’s position could be 
summarized as follows: the intentions that concern the application could be taken 
into consideration by the interpreter only if not inconsistent from a logical point of 
view with the further legally relevant intentions, but it does not hold the opposite, 
that is, the further intentions can override the intentions relative to the application. 
In this last case, the charge to the legislature, if this is the case, is an error de facto. 
It’s not clear if Prof. Marmor has a normative approach to the relationship between 
further intentions and intentions which are relative to the application or he is mak-
ing a conceptual analysis. In any case, the asymmetry drawn in the relationship be-
tween further relevant intentions and intentions relative to the application is the 
trickiest point of Marmor’s analysis. According to me, the legislature will make a 
mistake, as Marmor says ‘an error of fact’, if he takes into account some means not 
fit to achieve his ends. The charge to the legislature of an error of fact, in the case in 
which the further intentions override on those resting upon the application, could be 
defended attributing to the legislature a mistake in the choice of the means-ends re-
lationship, because there are further intentions that don’t satisfy some expectations. 
But in this case there is no more relationship among different intentions (aims) and 
the relationship between further intentions and intentions that are relative to the ap-
plication is not among homogeneous entities, but rather among heterogeneous ones.  
 
 
7 The good legislature, like Bobbio said; see N. Bobbio, Le bon législateur, in Logique et 
Analyse, 1971, pp. 243-249. 
8 For some critical remarks about the use of counterfactuals in legal interpretation see J. 
Stoljar, Vagueness, Counterfactual Intentions, and Legal Interpretation, in Legal Theory, 
2001, pp. 447-465.  
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3. The Expertise-problem  
 
At the end of this paper, I make some commentaries about the following quo-
tation9: 
 
People are morally responsible for their choices and actions only if they are based on 
their own moral deliberation and ethical choices. So there seems to be host of epis-
temic and ethical considerations which count against the possibility of recognizing ex-
pertise in the moral domain. Therefore, it seems that laws which are based on moral 
reasons cannot be associated with the expertise branch of the normal justification the-
sis, and thus would not call for any particular deference to legislative intent. 
 
This is a normative thesis, as Marmor says, so it should be evaluated as such, 
for its perspicuity. Now I try to present an argument based on the observation of 
the legal experiences of coexisting continental (and not only) legal systems, 
which have a rigid constitution and a system of checks and balances in order to 
control the legislature’s activities: my aim is to demonstrate that Prof. Marmor’s 
thesis does not fit well with such experiences and could be self-defeating, forbid-
ding the realization of its purpose. 
In these legal systems, the legislature acts in the constitutional domain, but not 
only: the institutional task of the legislature is exactly that of taking into consid-
eration morally irrelevant issues, not only that of assuming the responsibility to 
regulate delicate and controversial social issues at the moral level. If this is the 
legislature’s task, it does not imply that one should make the legislature’s inten-
tions mandatory on morally relevant issues. But we don’t need to do the opposite 
either (as Marmor argues instead). 
Let me expand on this point. 
The existence of a rigid constitution and of a check of constitutionality drives 
towards different considerations. On the basis of the tasks that the legislature has 
to pursue, he is in some sense previously expert with respect to all those things on 
which he could legislate. The point is that the legislature could be a bad expertise, 
and this occurs, for example, when he acts against the (rigid) constitution, and his 
activities could be badly considered. To understand whether the legislature has 
been a bad expertise might be useful, and it is rather sometimes necessary, to re-
turn to his intention, ‘lay it bare’, and this becomes especially important when 
one is concerned with delicate questions from a moral point of view. In short, if 
the expertise does not imply a positive connotation, then there is no reason to ex-
clude the consideration of the legislature as an expert subject on moral issues, un-
til proved otherwise, and use the appeal to the legislature’s intention precisely in 
order to provide such proof. I know that this is a criticism to Raz’s ‘normal justi-
fication thesis’ more than a criticism to Prof. Marmor10. 
 
 
9 A. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, p. 139. 
10 Perhaps, but I’m not so sure. 
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